Private: Călin Georgescu Reshapes Romania’s Foreign Policy

Executive Summary:

• Romania’s leading presidential candidate, Călin Georgescu, is positioning the country closer to Russia by subverting the current democratic trajectory and alignment with Western institutions.
• If elected, Georgescu’s reshaping of Romania’s foreign policy and regional strategic posture will negatively impact relations with its neighbors, NATO, and the European Union.
• On Sunday, March 9, protests erupted over the Central Electoral Bureau’s ruling to bar  Georgescu from standing in Romania’s presidential elections this May in what is a new episode of foreign policy contestation that the country has not experienced since the early 1990s.

The rising prominence of far-right candidate Călin Georgescu in the first round of Romania’s 2024 presidential race is not only challenging Bucharest’s established political institutions, but it also signals a potential reorientation of Romania’s established foreign policy direction with Europe and with its Western partners. In recent statements, Georgescu questioned Ukrainian sovereignty and territorial integrity by describing Ukraine as an “invented state” destined to be divided among its neighbors (Euronews, January 30). This rhetoric, echoing Russian propaganda, is emblematic of Georgescu’s broader call for a diversified foreign policy. On Sunday, March 9, Romania’s Central Electoral Bureau rejected the registration of Georgescu’s candidacy for the presidential elections scheduled for this May (National.ro, March 10). If elected, his approach could fundamentally reshape Romania’s foreign policy and regional strategic posture, with negative implications for its neighbors, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and the European Union.

Georgescu’s election could mark a decisive break from decades of near-automatic alignment with Western positions. First, his presidency might lead to a significant reduction in political and military support for Ukraine, weakening Romania’s role as a vital conduit for Western aid and undermining its reliability as a partner for the United States and its European allies. Moreover, his economic nationalism could spur policies aimed at reclaiming control over key sectors ranging from energy to agriculture that have long been influenced by foreign investment and trade. Such a shift might necessitate a renegotiation of Romania’s commitments within the European Union, straining relations with Brussels and challenging the broader European discourse on economic and security reforms. Within the European Union, his presidency could also strengthen the coalition led by Viktor Orbán in the European Council, a bloc intent on upending the European Union’s liberal political identity. Such contestation has not occurred in Romania since the early days after the country’s revolution in 1989 (Radu, 2018).

In a series of controversial statements, Georgescu has suggested that historical regions such as Northern Bukovina, Budjak, and Northern Maramureș which spanned across modern-day Romania, Ukraine, and Moldova, could be “reclaimed” by Romania while other areas might be reassigned to neighboring states such as Hungary, Poland, or Russia (Adevărul, January 30). Ukrainian officials have condemned these remarks as a blatant affront in line with the Kremlin’s revisionist narratives to Ukraine’s internationally recognized borders (Kyiv Independent, January 30). By labeling Ukraine as an “invented state,” Georgescu not only undermines Ukrainian sovereignty and statehood but also contradicts Romanian foreign policy that the Helsinki Final Act and the 1997 Romanian-–Ukrainian basic treaty have long upheld  (Conference on Security and Co-Operation in Europe, Final Act, 1975; UN iLibrary, June 2, 1997; Bne IntelliNews, January 31).

This stance is particularly alarming given Romania’s pivotal role as a conduit for Western aid to Ukraine and as a staunch supporter of Kyiv in its defense against Russia’s full-scale invasion (Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, October 22, 2024). Georgescu’s remarks on Ukraine, however, are just one example of a broader set of policy positions aimed at redefining Romania’s foreign and security strategy (CalinGeorgescu.ro, November 2024). If enacted, his rhetoric risks reversing Romania’s long-standing commitment to deepening integration with the West.

At the core of Georgescu’s rhetoric lies an alternative vision for Romania’s foreign policy and security strategy. Georgescu calls for diversification of Romania’s approach through “pragmatic” engagement with all great powers, including Russia, the People’s Republic of China, and the United States (Gândul, January 30). Georgescu insists that Romania should not function as a “colony” or servile state vis-à-vis these powers, emphasizing that “Romania and the Romanian people come first” (Evenimentul Zilei, November 24, 2024).

Connected to this vision, Georgescu advocates for strategic hedging—leveraging competition among great powers—to maximize national benefits (Bursa, January 31). This approach, while preserving Romania’s flexibility in a volatile regional environment dominated by a revisionist Russia, is a double-edged sword. As can be seen in the experiences of Serbia and Hungary, such a strategy may mitigate risks but also potentially alienate Romania from its traditional allies and weaken the collective security arrangements crucial for its long-term stability and prosperity (Global Policy Journal, December 5 2023; Carnegie Endowment, January 19, 2023; The Geopolitics, August 26, 2024).

Georgescu also voices strong reservations about Romania’s participation in multilateral frameworks, particularly if they constrain Bucharest’s agency to maneuver or impose external normative or economic standards (Digi24, January 15).  For instance, he has questioned, and, at times, outright dismissed, the benefits of the European Union, labeling it a disaster for the Romanian people (Evenimentul Zilei, January 16). On the economic front, Georgescu’s manifesto champions self-reliance and “distributism,” a model centered on small-scale farming and cooperativism, challenging the foundational pillars of the EU single market and Romania’s post-Communist commitment to free market economics (CalinGeorgescu.ro, November 2024). This perspective is distinctly unilateral and nationalist.

Leaders including Hungary’s Viktor Orbán and Slovakia’s Roberto Fico have similarly sought to engage with Russia and China while maintaining ties with the West. For example, Georgescu’s critique of NATO, referring to its missile defense systems as “a shame of diplomacy” and its financial obligations as “ultra-secondary,” mirrors Orbán and Fico’s arguments that alliance commitments are not worth the cost if they encroach on national sovereignty (Calea Europeană, December 4, 2024; The Geopolitics, 12 October 2024; Balkan Insight, 20 January 2025). For Georgescu, a diversified foreign policy that rejects multilateral constraints is not only a security or economic strategy but also a cultural project designed to reclaim national dignity by defying perceived external impositions (Gândul, December 3, 2024).

While this approach may resonate domestically among voters who view Bucharest as overly subservient to Brussels or Washington, it also poses risks to the country’s strategic interests which have taken decades to achieve. A pivot away from the European Union, which Romania joined in 2004, and NATO, which it joined in 2007, could signal that Romania is diverging from democracy and collective Western security interests while pursuing isolationist economic development.

If Georgescu were elected president, the implications for Romania’s foreign policy would be detrimental. Much would depend, however, on the pro-Western majority in Parliament. Under Romania’s semi-presidential system, the president’s authority is largely confined to directing foreign and defense policy, subject to the limitations set by the prime minister. Many of the president’s key powers—such as participation in the European Council or the appointment of top intelligence officials—are derived from legislation or Constitutional Court decisions rather than the Constitution itself (Republic of Romania, 1991). They can, therefore, be curtailed by a parliamentary majority or the Court, if necessary. Nonetheless, the president retains an important role in shaping the nation’s foreign and security agenda even if these powers would be curtailed.

Georgescu ultimately offers a radical departure from Romania’s long-standing foreign policy consensus. His political positions challenge the very tenets of Romania’s foreign policy and identity in relation to Europe and the West,  which enjoyed broad support among both the elites and the populace over the past three decades. In doing so, he effectively undermined the country’s elite consensus and ignited a new episode of foreign policy contestation that the country has not experienced since its early days after the Romanian revolution.