US success in Iraq means being a more reliable partner than Iran

This article is part of an MEI strategic initiative that examines how to enhance regional cooperation between the United States and its partners on addressing the challenges posed by Iran across the region, particularly in key areas like Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Yemen, Israel-Palestine, and the Ukraine war. Through a series of articles, short papers, events, podcasts, and a final policy report, the initiative will showcase a broad range of viewpoints and subject-matter expertise to inform a holistic and resolute approach toward Iran.
 

There is no quick path to limiting or reducing Iranian influence in Iraq. Tehran will react fiercely to American efforts to destroy the militias and zero-out its influence, and it would have multiple avenues to escalate through the porous 900-mile-long border between the two countries. Moreover, domestic Iraqi reaction, especially among elements of the Shi’a population, would be reticent at best and hostile at worst to intensified American military actions. Nor should it be an American goal to stoke a civil war among Iraq’s Shi’a that would give Iran new access points.

Washington needs to recognize that some elements of Iraq’s relationship with Iran are, in fact, stabilizing. Until there are readily available substitutes, Iraqi imports of natural gas and electricity from Iran are important to public welfare and stability, as anyone who has experienced summer heat in Iraq should understand. Heavy traffic from Iranian religious pilgrims is important to the economies of key cities such as Najaf, Karbala, and Baghdad. The American goal must not be the elimination of Iranian influence in Iraq but rather helping Iraqis ensure Iran’s proxies do not solidify a permanent state within a state. Fortunately, Iraqi Sunni and Shi’a Arabs, and Kurds, are reluctant to accept Iranian hegemony. Even Iraqi Shi’a Islamists would rather play the United States against Iran to boost their own immediate interests. The overwhelming majority of Iraqis, including the leadership, do not want to be in the middle of a US-Iran conflict. Pressure from various Iraqi communities, including the Shi’a religious leadership and government officials, on the militias to stand down against Israel shows there are elements with whom the Americans can work.

Supporting a stronger Iraq

The American goal should be a stronger Iraq that enjoys support from its diverse communities, a monopoly on force, and good relations with its regional neighbors and the West. The US can help achieve this by showing Iraqi leaders, both in and outside government, that relations with the US, the West, and regional partners offer benefits beyond what Iran and its narrow efforts to divide and control Iraqi politics can provide.

This requires, first, engaging all Iraqi political parties, including Shi’a Islamists and even the Shi’a militias themselves, without being seen as undermining the legitimate Iraqi government. Iraqi parties and militias must show their own communities better security, economic prosperity, improved public services, and progress against corruption (even as many are themselves corrupt). Washington needs to hear directly from Iraqi leaders about their concerns and expectations from the US. In addition, policymakers need to meet with and listen to Iraqis who are outside political circles, ranging from educators to the media to students to people in the business and arts communities. Obviously, the US cannot fulfill all demands, but Washington does need to understand Iraqi concerns and priorities when determining where to focus its own efforts, and it should also explain American viewpoints and sensitivities, such as the national and regional benefits of integrating Iraq’s electricity sector with those of its Arab neighbors or the risks to Iraq of ignoring American sanctions laws.

This effort to boost mutual understanding will require working around overly conservative security measures at US diplomatic posts in Baghdad and Erbil. Increased contact between Iraqis and US embassy personnel and visits by senior officials from the new administration, civilian and military, would underline American seriousness. The lack of high-level visits has reinforced Iranian influence. In addition, having senior staff at the American Embassy who speak Arabic (and Kurdish if possible) and venture out to meet Iraqis will gain approval from large segments of the Iraqi government and society while causing discomfort to Tehran and its clients in Iraq. The current American ambassador has achieved a measure of success in this regard, and much more of this type of engagement is needed.

Meaningful collaboration is possible

As the US reimagines collaboration with Iraqis, policymakers should consider ways of offering meaningful assistance to essential Iraqi institutions tasked with providing constituents with solutions related to security, economic prosperity, and education. With concurrence from Baghdad, this could include direct support to:

• Units of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) and Peshmerga with clean human rights records that are fighting against Islamic State terrorists. This assistance should fall under the umbrella of a bilateral military assistance mission coordinated with other Western governments. Strong, loyal ISF units are vital to the success of the Iraqi state.

• The financial sector, and in particular banking regulators, to strengthen Iraqi capabilities to staunch money laundering and unauthorized flows of currency outside Iraq’s borders. Again, this assistance could be coordinated with other Western governments and outside experts. A stronger banking system will reduce cash flows to Iran and focus Iraqi attention on domestic investment and trade with the international system.

• Universities, building on existing small US Department of State grants to strengthen the Iraqi higher education system and to produce the next generation of leaders who will support Iraq’s broader interests.

The US should share its experience and build professional connections with Iraqis in government and outside. In my decades of diplomatic work, the effort that best helped build bridges and display American capabilities in a relatively short period of time was visitor exchange programs. As President-elect Donald Trump’s second administration develops its approach to Iraq, it should consider demonstrating to Iraqis that deep relations with the US offer benefits that Iran cannot surpass, and it can do that by boosting funding for exchange programs that, in the end, are far cheaper than military aid or military operations. Areas that it should consider initially might include:

• Government operations and oversight: Arrange visits by deputies from various Iraqi political parties to federal and state government legislatures, departments, and agencies to share experiences in conducting oversight, management, and constituent services.

• Urban water management and planning: Bring Iraqi urban planners and local and national political leaders to cities with similar challenges, such as Las Vegas, Phoenix, and San Diego, for meetings with local experts and officials.

• Agricultural management: Arrange visits by Iraqi policy officials, farmers’ unions, and scientists to centers of excellence in the fields of agriculture, national resource management, and conservation.

• Corruption mitigation: Support Iraqi anti-corruption efforts by inviting officials and activists at the national and local levels involved in fighting corruption to visit corresponding American institutions for exchanges of information about the judicial system, laws and legal procedures, and investigative processes.

• Educational initiatives: Increase Fulbright exchanges so that more Iraqi students and faculty can spend an extended period in American institutions of higher learning and, when security permits, bring American faculty to teach at the American universities in Sulaymaniyah, Dohuk, and Baghdad.

Iran cannot compete with America in any of these fields, and Iraqis will appreciate American help of this kind. Concrete collaboration in these areas is precisely what the Iraqi government seeks through our bilateral strategic framework agreement signed in 2007. The administration could make further inroads by inviting members of parliament, especially from the foreign affairs and security/defense committees, and local officials to visit the US to get an up-close view of the conduct of American foreign and security policy by officials and experts, both in Washington and beyond. The strength of personal connections should not be underestimated.

 

Robert Ford is a senior fellow at the Middle East Institute where he writes about developments in the Levant and North Africa. He retired from the US Foreign Service in 2014 after serving as Ambassador to Syria and Algeria and Deputy Chief of Mission in Iraq and Bahrain.

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